/snap/core20/2769/etc/apparmor.d/abstractions
Edit: /snap/core20/2769/etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/base (6544B)
# vim:syntax=apparmor
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Novell/SUSE
# Copyright (C) 2009-2011 Canonical Ltd.
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
# License published by the Free Software Foundation.
#
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# (Note that the ldd profile has inlined this file; if you make
# modifications here, please consider including them in the ldd
# profile as well.)
# The __canary_death_handler function writes a time-stamped log
# message to /dev/log for logging by syslogd. So, /dev/log, timezones,
# and localisations of date should be available EVERYWHERE, so
# StackGuard, FormatGuard, etc., alerts can be properly logged.
/dev/log w,
/dev/random r,
/dev/urandom r,
# Allow access to the uuidd daemon (this daemon is a thin wrapper around
# time and getrandom()/{,u}random and, when available, runs under an
# unprivilged, dedicated user).
/run/uuidd/request r,
/etc/locale/** r,
/etc/locale.alias r,
/etc/localtime r,
/etc/writable/localtime r,
/usr/share/locale-bundle/** r,
/usr/share/locale-langpack/** r,
/usr/share/locale/** r,
/usr/share/**/locale/** r,
/usr/share/zoneinfo/ r,
/usr/share/zoneinfo/** r,
/usr/share/X11/locale/** r,
/run/systemd/journal/dev-log w,
# systemd native journal API (see sd_journal_print(4))
/run/systemd/journal/socket w,
# Nested containers and anything using systemd-cat need this. 'r' shouldn't
# be required but applications fail without it. journald doesn't leak
# anything when reading so this is ok.
/run/systemd/journal/stdout rw,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/locale/** mr,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/gconv/*.so mr,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/gconv/gconv-modules* mr,
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gconv/*.so mr,
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gconv/gconv-modules* mr,
# used by glibc when binding to ephemeral ports
/etc/bindresvport.blacklist r,
# ld.so.cache and ld are used to load shared libraries; they are best
# available everywhere
/etc/ld.so.cache mr,
/etc/ld.so.conf r,
/etc/ld.so.conf.d/{,*.conf} r,
/etc/ld.so.preload r,
/{usr/,}lib{,32,64}/ld{,32,64}-*.so mr,
/{usr/,}lib/@{multiarch}/ld{,32,64}-*.so mr,
/{usr/,}lib/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/ld-*.so mr,
/{usr/,}lib/i386-linux-gnu/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/ld-*.so mr,
/opt/*-linux-uclibc/lib/ld-uClibc*so* mr,
# we might as well allow everything to use common libraries
/{usr/,}lib{,32,64}/** r,
/{usr/,}lib{,32,64}/**.so* mr,
/{usr/,}lib/@{multiarch}/** r,
/{usr/,}lib/@{multiarch}/**.so* mr,
/{usr/,}lib/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/*.so* mr,
/{usr/,}lib/i386-linux-gnu/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/*.so* mr,
# /dev/null is pretty harmless and frequently used
/dev/null rw,
# as is /dev/zero
/dev/zero rw,
# recent glibc uses /dev/full in preference to /dev/null for programs
# that don't have open fds at exec()
/dev/full rw,
# Sometimes used to determine kernel/user interfaces to use
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/version r,
# Depending on which glibc routine uses this file, base may not be the
# best place -- but many profiles require it, and it is quite harmless.
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/ngroups_max r,
# glibc's sysconf(3) routine to determine free memory, etc
@{PROC}/meminfo r,
@{PROC}/stat r,
@{PROC}/cpuinfo r,
@{sys}/devices/system/cpu/ r,
@{sys}/devices/system/cpu/online r,
# glibc's *printf protections read the maps file
@{PROC}/@{pid}/{maps,auxv,status} r,
# libgcrypt reads some flags from /proc
@{PROC}/sys/crypto/* r,
# some applications will display license information
/usr/share/common-licenses/** r,
# glibc statvfs
@{PROC}/filesystems r,
# glibc malloc (man 5 proc)
@{PROC}/sys/vm/overcommit_memory r,
# Allow determining the highest valid capability of the running kernel
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap r,
# Allow other processes to read our /proc entries, futexes, perf tracing and
# kcmp for now (they will need 'read' in the first place). Administrators can
# override with:
# deny ptrace (readby) ...
ptrace (readby),
# Allow other processes to trace us by default (they will need 'trace' in
# the first place). Administrators can override with:
# deny ptrace (tracedby) ...
ptrace (tracedby),
# Allow us to ptrace read ourselves
ptrace (read) peer=@{profile_name},
# Allow unconfined processes to send us signals by default
signal (receive) peer=unconfined,
# Allow us to signal ourselves
signal peer=@{profile_name},
# Checking for PID existence is quite common so add it by default for now
signal (receive, send) set=("exists"),
# Allow us to create and use abstract and anonymous sockets
unix peer=(label=@{profile_name}),
# Allow unconfined processes to us via unix sockets
unix (receive) peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow us to create abstract and anonymous sockets
unix (create),
# Allow us to getattr, getopt, setop and shutdown on unix sockets
unix (getattr, getopt, setopt, shutdown),
# Workaround https://launchpad.net/bugs/359338 until upstream handles stacked
# filesystems generally. This does not appreciably decrease security with
# Ubuntu profiles because the user is expected to have access to files owned
# by him/her. Exceptions to this are explicit in the profiles. While this rule
# grants access to those exceptions, the intended privacy is maintained due to
# the encrypted contents of the files in this directory. Files in this
# directory will also use filename encryption by default, so the files are
# further protected. Also, with the use of 'owner', this rule properly
# prevents access to the files from processes running under a different uid.
# encrypted ~/.Private and old-style encrypted $HOME
owner @{HOME}/.Private/ r,
owner @{HOME}/.Private/** mrixwlk,
# new-style encrypted $HOME
owner @{HOMEDIRS}/.ecryptfs/*/.Private/ r,
owner @{HOMEDIRS}/.ecryptfs/*/.Private/** mrixwlk,